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Abstract—This paper analyses the concept of Self-Sovereign
Identity (SSI), an emerging approach for establishing digital iden-
tity, in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). We contrast
existing approaches for identity on the Internet, such as cloud-
based accounts and digital certificates, with SSI standards such
as Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials
(VCs). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first thorough
comparison of these approaches. The benefits and challenges of
using DIDs and VCs to identify and authenticate IoT devices
and their respective users are discussed. In the end, we establish
that SSI, with its owner-centric, privacy-aware and decentrailized
approach, provides a viable and attractive option for secure
identification of IoT devices and users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet was developed as a research project to intercon-
nect computers [1]. Protocols like TCP/IP, developed as open
standards, allowed computers to connect in a global scale.
However, even after the world-changing impacts the Internet
had on society over the last decades, it has no pervasive,
privacy-preserving, and easy to use mechanism to manage
digital identities.
Where human activity is involved, a common abstraction is
to use accounts, i.e. digital records, often containing personally
identifiable information (PII), that are protected by a password
and saved on a webserver. Although this method has been
working for several decades, it has many security drawbacks,
such as the use of weak passwords [2] and the potential
for privacy violation. Furthermore, the manual approach of
password-protected accounts makes it unsuitable to machine-
to-machine interactions, a common scenario in the IoT.
More automated solutions can be achieved by using Public
Key Certificates (PKCs) that bind names to public keys [3].
Widespread use of PKC, however, is limited to organizations,
due to the complexity of current methods. For instance, while
websites usually prove their identities to web browsers using
certificates, users do not use certificates in the same way,
i.e. to prove their identity to the website. Moreover, existing
standards were not designed for privacy, as evidenced by the
use of real names in known certificate formats such as PGP
[4] and X.509 [5]. To aggravate the situation, the assignment
of unique names often require centralized architectures, which
is inadequate for distributed IoT applications.
A recent development towards online identification of users,
organizations, and devices has been referred to as “Self-
Sovereign Identity” (SSI). The basic premise of SSI is that
subjects should own and control their own identity, instead of
having it stored and managed by a third party. This approach
brings several benefits, including enhanced privacy, control,
and decentralization. Two new standards are being proposed
to realize SSI, namely, Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and
Verifiable Credentials (VCs) [6], [7]. While DIDs focus on
cryptographic identification, VCs provide a means for privacy-
aware and authenticated attribute disclosure.
In this paper we analyze existing approaches to identity in
the Internet, such as X.509, PGP [4], and SSI. We present
a detailed comparison focusing on the data models used
to represent identity across different standards. Finally, we
discuss what are the benefits of using SSI in the Internet of
Things, and identify challenges that must be overcome.
II. SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY
Self-Sovereign Identity is an approach in which subjects
are in full control of their own digital identities [8]. SSI is
analogous to offline identifiers, which are carried by the owner
(within a physical wallet), but contrasts with current digital
identity solutions, which are either based on accounts or digital
certificates, and have privacy and centralization issues.
While initially proposed by members [8] of online com-
munities, a formal definition of SSI was released recently
[9]. Considering an identity to be composed of an identifier
associated with a set of name-value attributes, the full self-
sovereign identity of an individual is the collection of all
identities (i.e. identifiers and attributes) that span a range
of decentralized domains, such that the individual is in full
control of these identities [9]. As digital privacy concerns have
been growing in recent years, interest in SSI has intensified.
This led to the definition of a set of technical specifications
to implement SSI, which we describe below.
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A. Decentralized Identifiers
Digital identifiers so far have been either centralized or non-
resolvable. For example, Uniform Resource Locators (URLs),
which can be used to resolve HTML documents, usually
depend on domains names assigned by ICANN1, a centralized
authority. On the other hand, unique, user-generated identifiers
such as UUIDs cannot be used to resolve associated metadata.
To address this, a new specification for Decentralized
Identifiers (DIDs) is being developed with the support
of the W3C [6]. The DID has the following syntax:
did:btcr:abcdefgh12345678. The did prefix is mandatory,
and colons are used to separate a method definition and a
method-specific id. A method is a specific set of rules for
working with DIDs (the example above uses the Bitcoin
method), and the format of the id depends on that method.
An open directory of different DID methods is available for
public access and open for new submissions2.
Each DID is associated with a DID Document (DDo)
that contains the DID itself along with public keys, service
endpoints, and other metadata. The public key is used to
authenticate and encrypt messages, while the endpoint pro-
vides a way to message the entity that controls that DID. To
control a specific DID, a subject just have to own a private
key associated with public keys in the DDo.
A common storage mechanism for DDos are Blockchains,
from which they can be resolved using the referred DID. On
the other hand, in some cases individuals may not want to
publish their DIDs, e.g. to avoid identity correlation. In this
case, the special peer DID method can be used. Thus, DIDs are
unique identifiers that can be resolved to DID Documents, and
they allow the establishment of an end-to-end secure channel.
What DIDs do not provide, however, is a means for entities
to prove claims (attributes) about themselves.
B. Verifiable Credentials
Verifiable Credentials (VCs) is a W3C recommendation for
portable and provable claims about a subject. For instance, a
person may claim to have the name Alice, and a device may
claim to be of type Camera. The relationship among DIDs
and VCs is shown in Figure 1. All VCs refer to the DID of
the subject to which they have been assigned (e.g. an IoT
device). VCs also contain the DID of its issuer along with a
cryptographic proof. This allows a subject to present a VC
to a verifier, which can then resolve the DDo of the issuer
(and therefore its public key) from a public ledger, e.g. a
Blockchain, and check the authenticity of the VC. Figure 2
shows a use case where a user issues a VC to a device.
A major incentive for SSI is privacy, therefore VCs are
expected to be private and stored in a personal wallet, to
be shared only when necessary. To further improve privacy,
the VC specification supports zero-knowledge proofs, i.e. a
cryptographic technique “where an entity can prove to another
1Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers -
https://www.icann.org/
2https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-registry/
entity that they know a certain value without disclosing the
actual value” [7].
Fig. 1. A DID is the link between a DDo and a set of VCs, much like
a primary key can link different tables in a database. This allows a subject
associated with a DID to prove its identity.
Fig. 2. An owner-centric scenario using SSI. Each subject generates its own
DDo, while the VC is issued by the device owner.
C. Decentralization, privacy, and layered authentication
Public key cryptography can be used to derive a shared
secret over an insecure channel [10]. However, a known
problem is how to trust the origin of the public key. To
solve this, a signed certificate that binds a name to a public
key was proposed [3]. Two common standards for digital
certificates are X.509 [5], [11] and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
[4]. Although they differ in details, both follow the original
definition in which names are tied to public keys and signed
by a third party [3].
A crucial challenge faced by certificate-based solutions was
ensuring the uniqueness of the names. The most common
solution to this was to rely on centralized architectures. For
example, the name on the subject field in X.509 must be
enforced by a global authority, and the PGP id uses the name
of a person plus her email address, which ultimately depends
on DNS, which is centralized as well.
More recently, the emergence of Blockchain technology
allows decentralized consensus for choosing unique names.
One problem, however, is that solutions based on certificates
put sensitive information in the identifier, which compromises
the privacy of certificate holders, and therefore might not be
suitable for storage in public, immutable ledgers.
An approach to solve this is to limit the exposure of PII on
the ledger by only writing anonymous information to it, e.g.,
public keys. In particular, this approach enables public key
storage and lookup, which can be used to create a confidential
and non-repudiable channel. Higher-level abstractions can
then be used to implement authentication, since the attributes
necessary to authenticate users are usually application-specific.
This is the solution that results from combining the DID
and VC specifications. Containing only pseudonymous in-
formation, such as public keys and service endpoints, DID
Documents can be used to establish a cryptographically secure
channel between two entities. After the confidential channel is
created, the entities can exchange VCs, according to the levels
of trust necessary to each application. In other words, while
DIDs are lower-level and pseudonymous, VCs are application-
specific and can be used to authenticate attributes such as name
or device type. Finally, it is worth noting that as each DID is
usually a high-entropy random string, name collisions actually
stop being a concern.
III. DATA MODELS FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY
This section provides analysis and comparisons of existing
data models for digital identity. We start by discussing the
limitations of password-based accounts, and then proceed to
compare data models based on public key cryptography.
A. Accounts
The most basic method to identify subjects in computer
systems is the account: a digital record, usually composed of
at least a user name and a password, that identifies a user.
Accounts are commonly stored in a server controlled by the
service provider. For example, popular IoT vendors require
that a device owner have a cloud-based account, so that she
can use this virtual identity to configure her devices.
While accounts have been used for decades in a variety
of systems, they are among the most primitive solutions for
digital identities. Among the problems related to account-
based authentication are privacy and the use of passwords.
With respect to privacy, issues arise because the user is
forced to store plaintext PII in a third-party system. Regarding
passwords, the literature indicates common problems such as
password reuse and difficulty to enforce strong passwords,
and points that the most widespread solution is the use of
“recommendations” [2], which depends on human factors and
are difficult to enforce.
B. Models based on public key cryptography
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [4] was created to allow individ-
uals to prove a binding between a public key and an identifier,
the latter being composed by a real name and an email address.
This binding, along with optional attributes and signatures,
is stored in a document called a PGP Key. Conceived as a
distributed solution, individuals in the PGP scheme can sign
the keys of other individuals, so as to give an endorsement that
they are who they say they are, i.e. they are not impersonating
someone or using a fake id. This scheme of peer signatures is
often referred to as the Web of Trust.
X.509 Certificates, created by the X.500 working group,
defines a format for Public Key Certificates (PKC) that binds
public keys to qualified names [5]. PKCs are widely used
in the Internet to authenticate domain names and protect
communications. Although technically nothing prevents peer-
to-peer signature of X.509 certificates, the vast majority of
its usage is under centralized architectures, in which a trusted
authority signs the certificate to make it trustworthy. Finally,
in certain cases it is useful to have a separate document that,
instead of having public key, contains only a name associated
with signed attributes. To meet this demand, X.509 proposed a
new standard called Attribute Certificate (AC), which contains
no public key, but links to a PKC through its subject field [11].
Finally, as previously mentioned, Self-Sovereign Identity is
a novel approach that uses Decentralized Identifiers [6] and
Verifiable Credentials [7] to prove possession of identifiers
and attributes, respectively.
C. High-level comparison
The following paragraphs compares models used by the
PGP, X.509, and SSI standards, according to Table I.
Goal: Both PGP Keys and PKCs are used to publish and
prove control of public keys that are tied to identifiers. Also,
in these approaches, attributes can be provided either in the
same document as the public keys (PGP Key and PKC), or,
in the case of X.509, in a separate document (AC). On the
other hand, documents in the SSI paradigm have decoupled
goals: DDos are be used to prove control of an identifier and
to provide a means for establishing a secure communication;
and VCs are used to prove possession of attributes.
Identifier (and uniqueness): While PGP and X.509 use
names and other identifiers that depend on centralized entities,
in SSI the identifiers are completely decentralized and can be
auto-generated, for example by using strong random number
generators. Not only this enables easy global uniqueness,
but the pseudonymous characteristic of DIDs also enhances
privacy, when compared to previous approaches based on real
names or email addresses. Pseudonymous identifiers are also
more suited for IoT, since devices do not have names or email
addresses by default.
Public Key(s): PKCs are limited to only one public key,
while PGP Keys and DDos can have many. PGP still differs
from DDos as the former uses a primary key that is tied to an
identifier and allows more subkeys to be included, while the
latter support multiple public keys without assumptions other
than the key type, which usually encodes its purpose, e.g. sign
or encrypt.
Attribute(s): Both PGP Keys and X.509 certificates sup-
port arbitrary attributes, either via PKC extensions or dedicated
ACs. In self-sovereign identity, a DDo does not support at-
tributes in order to stay anonymous. Instead, all PII is handled
only by VCs, which are private by default.
Endorsement(s): PGP Keys can be signed by one or more
peers, but X.509 certificates and VCs can only be signed by a
single issuer. DDos are not signed by external entities, and may
be self-signed. When a DDo is written to a ledger, however,
the transaction will be signed, which can be used to attest the
validity of the DDo. Another way of proving endorsement
over a DID is to check the signature of a VC associated
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF STANDARDIZED DATA MODELS FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY.
PGP X.509 Self-Sovereign Identity
PGP Key Public Key Certificate(PKC)
Attribute Certificate
(AC)
DID Document
(DDo)
Verifiable Credential
(VC)
Goal
Prove control of public
keys and identifier
(plus optional attributes)
Publish public keys
Prove control of public
keys and identifier
(plus optional attributes)
Publish public keys
Prove possession of
attributes
Prove control of identifier
Publish public keys and
service endpoints
Prove possession of
attributes
Identifier Name and Email Qualified Name Same as PKC Method-specific DID Same as DDo
Uniqueness
of identifier
Global
authority (DNS) Global authority (CA) Same as PKC
Ledger consensus /
Random number gen. Same as DDo
Public Key(s) 1 primary, N subkeys 1 n/a (points to PKC) N n/a (points to DDo)
Attribute(s) Attributes field Extensions field Attributes field - subjectCredential field
Endorsement Signature of many peers Signature of a CA Signature of a CA Self-signed (optional)Indirect through VC Signature of an Issuer
Service
endpoints - - n/a Yes n/a
Semantic
schemas - - - Yes Yes
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF DATA MODELS FOR KEY DISTRIBUTION.
Raw Pub Key PKC DDo
Associates key material
to metadata X X
Privacy: no PII disclosed X X
Key rotation does not
requires re-signing n/a X
Serialization formats BinaryBase64
DER
PEM
JSON-LD
JWT
Semantic schemas X
Decentralized: user
generates the artifact X X
Decentralized: user
carries the artifact X X X
Service endpoint X
with that DID. If the VC is signed by a trusted issuer, the
DID can be trusted. Furthermore, with respect to who can
sign the endorsements, technically it can be anyone, but there
are philosophical differences. X.509, for example, was devised
to work within a centralized architecture, where only trusted
authorities can sign certificates. On the other end of the spec-
trum, PGP expects peer-to-peer signatures, which ultimately
creates a Web of Trust. Finally, VCs does not make strong
assumptions on the network structure, although decentralized
approaches, especially the ones based on Blockchain, may be
favorable.
Service endpoints: a novelty introduced by DDos is
the association of a built-in mechanism to reach the owner
of a public key. This facilitates the establishment of secure
interactions between peers, from web to IoT environments.
Semantic schemas: only SSI-based data models allow
extensibility through semantic annotations over JSON docu-
ments. The main reason for this is that these technologies only
became popular after X.509 and PGP were developed.
D. Public key distribution
An important aspect in the design of systems based on
asymmetric encryption is the data model used to support key
distribution. In the following, we compare three approaches,
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF DATA MODELS FOR ATTRIBUTES.
PKC AC VC
Signed attributes
about a subject X X X
Key rotation does not
requires re-signing X X
Identifier differs from
key material X X X
Attributes decoupled
from key material X X
Selective disclosure X
Zero-knowledge proofs X
Delegation X
Revocation X X X
Serialization formats DERPEM
DER
PEM
JSON-LD
JWT
Semantic schemas X
Decentralized: user
carries the artifact X X X
Decentralized: Verifier
decoupled from Issuer X
as shown in Table II: Raw Public Key, Public Key Certificates,
and DID Document.
Raw public key: this is the simplest approach, and
consists in having a public key shared as a raw array of
bytes, often encoded in some ascii-compatible format, such as
base64. Although this approach is decentralized and discloses
no personal information, it does not allow associated metadata.
Public Key Certificate: as previously discussed, PKCs
bind a name and other attributes to a public key, which
allows subjects prove their identity. Created before privacy
was a major concern, X.509 PKCs always carry PII in the
main identifier, and may carry PII in other attributes. Finally,
other drawbacks of PKCs include the imposition of specialized
serialization formats (DER and PEM), tight coupling of keys
and data (which makes key rotation more difficult), and a
centralized architecture, i.e. the artifact is not self-generated.
DID Document: DDos associate public keys to pseudony-
mous metadata, while also allowing key rotation without re-
signing any associated metadata. The latter is possible because
all signed metadata actually only lives in associated VCs. An
important difference to highlight is that DDos are not signed
by third parties, thus they cannot authenticate the origin of
a public key. If this is necessary, DDos can be composed
with VCs to increase security. DDos supports JSON-based
serialization formats, which are available in most program-
ming languages and platforms, and can benefit from publicly
available semantic schemas. As each user auto-generates their
own DIDs and DDos, the management of the identifier is
decentralized. Finally, service endpoints in DDos provide a
novel way for peers to securely establish secure channels.
E. Attribute distribution
Four out of the five previously described formats can be
used to prove control over attributes: PGP Keys, Public Key
Certificates, Attribute Certificates, and Verifiable Credentials.
Since PGP Keys are less widely used, we only compare the
latter, as shown in Table III.
Public Key Certificates: the encoding of attributes in
PKCs leverages the X.509 PKC extension field. Although the
reuse of an existing format may seen advantageous in terms
of compatibility, the whole certificate must be re-signed when
a key is rotated, or when selective disclosure of attributes is
necessary. An important drawback not mentioned so far is that
it is impossible to disclose only a subset of the attributes in a
PKC, without contacting the issuer for a new signature.
Attribute Certificates: differing from PKCs, ACs contain
a name and a list of attributes, but no public key, which
simplifies key rotation. Finally, while ACs support delegation,
in general they have the same drawbacks as PKCs.
Verifiable Credentials: similar to an AC, a VC does
not contain public keys, as it focus on binding identifiers
to attributes. Among the novelties in the VC standard is the
support for selective disclosure without contacting the issuer,
which is realized using zero-knowledge cryptography. VCs
also leverage JSON, a serialization format that is both human
readable and lightweight to parse. VCs and can be further
specialized into two formats: JSON Linked Data (JSON-LD)3,
a format to serialize linked data; and JSON Web Token (JWT),
a widely used format to express security claims4.
IV. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF SSI FOR IOT
As the IoT continues to evolve, new paradigms that al-
low spontaneous machine-to-machine interactions started to
appear [12], [13]. Necessarily decentralized, the future IoT
will require users to be the root of trust of their devices,
leading to an owner-centric IoT. As privacy concerns raise
in importance, solutions that minimize personal data sharing
become paramount. Full realization of these and other features
will require novel, open, and secure standards for identity in
the IoT. The next paragraphs discuss aspects of self-sovereign
identity that are likely to improve decentralized IoT security,
while also pointing the factors that will require innovation to
bring SSI to IoT, such as support constrained devices.
3https://json-ld.org/
4https://jwt.io/
A. Benefits
The benefits of SSI for IoT, such as privacy and decentral-
ization, are discussed below.
Owner-Centric: The user can be the root of trust of
her devices. Once a user is the owner and controller of her
identity, it is straightforward to create a network of devices that
belong to her, for example by provisioning an “owner=Alice”
credential to each device. One interesting consequence of
this is that no third party is needed to enforce security and
administration of devices, as the user herself will be able
to do it. Note that in this approach devices can have their
own identity as well, and may only use the owner attribute
to facilitate the creation of trust relationships, i.e. devices that
share the same owner can automatically trust each other.
Privacy-preserving: Personal information is protected.
By having the identity of owners and things stored locally,
sensitive data that would otherwise be stored in a service
provider will now live closer to the owner (usually in a digital
wallet). While the user can choose to backup his data for
various reasons, she will be able to do so in an encrypted way,
as only she will possess the decryption keys. Users and devices
will also get to choose with whom they share their credentials,
and even be able to do so employing selective disclosure and
zero-knowledge proofs techniques, further improving privacy.
Decentralized: No single-point of failure. While identity
providers may have been a convenient way to authenticate
users and devices so far, it is not clear what happens when a
provider stops providing, e.g. when it goes out of business. In
the self-sovereign approach, the user decides when her identity
starts or stops being valid, and she will have similar controls
over her devices. Finally, data breaches, information sharing
without user consent, and other issues are minimized when
identities are not stored in a high-value data silo that acts as
a honeypot for hackers.
End-to-end security: Communications between two end-
points are secure. By exchanging DID Documents and apply-
ing asymmetric cryptography, IoT devices can mutually au-
thenticate, derive short-lived symmetric keys, send encrypted
messages, and enforce non-repudiation. This approach can also
be implemented in a transport-agnostic way, enabling secure
communication even among different protocols.
Layered authentication: Separates cryptographic and
application-specific authentication. In the former, two devices
prove to each other that they are in possession of specific
public keys, while in the latter the devices prove different
attributes about themselves. This approach allows endpoints
to always be cryptographically protected, and leaves higher-
level trust requirements to be handled at the application layer.
Standardized and open approach: Fosters interoperability
and robustness. Since both DIDs and VCs are being developed
as open W3C specifications, companies and researchers are
free to build solutions that are interoperable and rely on well-
tested data models.
JSON-based encoding: Using JSON enables more appli-
cations to handle data extracted from DID Documents and
credentials, even if not originally designed to work with SSI.
B. Challenges
We now discuss some challenges to apply SSI in IoT
environments.
Constrained devices: Fully adopting SSI means that
devices need to be able to run asymmetric cryptography and
cope with communication overhead of transmitting metadata,
such as DID Documents and Verifiable Credentials.
Asymmetric Cryptography: SSI demands execution of
encryption algorithms based on asymmetric keys, which can be
challenging in devices with limited processing and energy re-
sources. While authors points that constrained processors such
as the 32-bits Cortex M0 are well equipped to execute Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) [14], the number of operations
still must be controlled to avoid battery draining. A common
tactic is to use long lived session keys that are less frequently
updated, e.g. once a day.
Communication overhead: Depending on the communi-
cation protocol, the size of DDos and VCs may impose a
barrier. For example, low energy protocols such as LoRA
and BLE have maximum packet sizes of 222 and 244 bytes,
respectively, while DDos and VCs easily achieve 500 bytes or
more. Therefore, strategies such as compression, fragmenta-
tion, and infrequent document transmission, will be necessary.
In extreme cases, SSI may not be possible at all, which will
require proxy approaches [15].
DID Resolution: Higlhy constrained devices may not be
able to connect to the Internet to download DID Documents
at all. A possible solution is to create a local cache of known
DIDs, either managed by the device itself or by its gateway.
On the other hand, if both devices use peer DIDs, they can
simply exchange their DIDs directly, which shifts the problem
to securely delivering the DIDs in the first place.
Software availability: The SSI ecosystem is new and
there is limited software available for embedded devices.
Given the foundational importance of secure cryptographic
algorithms and protocols, applications based on SSI should
rely on existing libraries that encapsulate complexity and are
well tested, which reduces the chances for vulnerabilities. Al-
though reference implementations exist [16], they are focused
on cloud and mobile use cases. To fully incorporate SSI into
IoT, portable and lightweight libraries tailored for constrained
devices must be created and made widely available.
V. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE
As the primary motivation for the development of the
Internet was to remotely connect computers, the problem
of secure identification of users and devices was left aside.
While identity solutions such as accounts and certificates were
eventually developed, they feature critical issues such as weak
passwords, lack of privacy, and centralization. As it is common
for systems to mature over time, as good (and bad) practices
are learned, we argue that the Self-Sovereign Identity approach
represents an important step forward in the area of digital
identity. Particularly in the context of the IoT, this paper
showed how SSI can (1) empower owners to have full control
over both their identities and their devices, (2) improve privacy
by decoupling pseudonymous and sensitive identity records,
and (3) allow decentralized identity management by reducing
the dependency on third parties. As for the next steps, the
realization of SSI in the IoT will demand implementations that
are optimized for constrained devices, both for cryptographic
operations and low-power communication. Furthermore, wide
adoption of SSI will depend on the availability of open
software libraries to manipulate DIDs and VCs in IoT devices.
To conclude we argue that, if adopted, SSI may significantly
benefit security and privacy of IoT applications, and potentially
enable new use cases, such as those that involve cross-owner
decentralized interactions.
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